Computer Reservations Systems, Airlines, and the Internet by Minick, Aimee
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 65 | Issue 4 Article 9
2000
Computer Reservations Systems, Airlines, and the
Internet
Aimee Minick
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aimee Minick, Computer Reservations Systems, Airlines, and the Internet, 65 J. Air L. & Com. 891 (2000)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol65/iss4/9
COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS,
AIRLINES, AND THE INTERNET
AIMEE MINICK*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BACKGROUND .................................... 894
A. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS
SYSTEM S ........................................ 894
1. Original Computer Reservations Systems ....... 894
2. Internet Computer Reservations Systems ........ 897
B. PARTICIPATION IN COMPUTER RESERVATIONS
SYSTEM S ........................................ 898
C. OPERATION OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS
SYSTEM S ........................................ 899
1. Travel Agent Operation ...................... 899
2. Internet Operation ........................... 900
II. CONCERNS REGARDING COMPUTER
RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS ........................ 901
A . B IASING ......................................... 901
B. COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES FOR TRAVEL
A GENTS ......................................... 903
C. SMALL CARRIER BIASING ........................ 904
III. LEGAL HISTORY .................................. 905
A. ANTITRUST ACTIONS AGAINST AIRLINES .......... 905
1. Legal Theories ............................... 905
a. Monopoly Leveraging .................. 907
b. Essential Facilities ...................... 908
2. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. .. 909
a. Monopoly Leveraging .................. 910
b. Essential Facilities ...................... 911
B. REGULATION OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS
SYSTEM S ........................................ 913
1. Civil Aeronautics Board Authority ............ 913
* Southern Methodist University School of Law, JD Candidate May 2000.
891
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. Development of CAB Regulations .............. 914
3. DOT Takeover of CAB Authority and New
Regulations ................................. 915
IV. CURRENT REGULATIONS ........................ 916
A. COVERAGE OF THE RULES ....................... 916
B. ARE THE REGULATIONS STILL NEEDED? .......... 918
V. APPLICATION OF DOT REGULATIONS TO
INTERNET USE ................................... 921
A. APPLICATION OF CURRENT REGULATIONS TO
INTERNET CRS .................................. 921
B. WILL THE DOT REGULATE INTERNET CRS? ..... 924
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................... 926
A MERICANS GO on thousands of business trips and vaca-
tions every year. Many potential travelers go through a
travel agent to book their trips. The travel agents, in turn, use
sophisticated systems to determine the best price and times for
their customers to travel and the best available hotels in their
destination cities. These systems are called computer reserva-
tions systems (CRS). Computer reservations systems are the
backbone of the travel agent's business. These systems allow the
agent to reserve airline tickets, hotel rooms, and rental cars.
Computer reservations systems first appeared in the late
1970s; since then, they have become increasingly important, al-
most indispensable, for both travel agents and airlines. Airline
companies first developed CRS and still control a majority of the
current CRS. The close connection between travel booking
(CRS) and travel operation (airlines) led to a climate where le-
gal challenges seemed inevitable. Smaller airlines filed antitrust
suits against the airlines that owned CRS.' The plaintiffs in
these suits claimed that the airlines that controlled the CRS un-
fairly prejudiced the displays, which in turn affected reservation
volume in favor of the CRS owner's airline.'
I When the Civil Aeronautics Board reviewed CRS practices, they found ac-
tions that may be "analogous to conduct that would be labeled an abuse of mo-
nopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2." Carrier-Owned
Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644, 11,647 (1984) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
2 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir.
1991).
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After airline deregulation in 1978,- the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) found it necessary to regulate the CRS industry.4
The CAB promulgated many administrative regulations.' The
regulations dealt with all facets of the CRS industry." The CAB
regulations sought to avoid the problems identified in various
antitrust cases.7 These regulations, with few modifications, exist
today. This comment will examine many topics; one important
question it seeks to answer is: "Are the regulations still
necessary?"
In the late 1990s, the CRS industry made these systems availa-
ble to non-travel agent users, via the Internet. The programs
allow users to choose a time, date, and destination for travel.
The CRS then searches its database to find an acceptable itiner-
ary based on the user's preferences (price, airline, etc.). In-
ternet users may purchase their tickets on-line through secure
connections in the system.' This form of travel reservation may
soon surpass agent reservation.' Because Internet use of CRS by
non-travel agents is new, many are questioning what impact the
3 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C.).
, It was assumed that when Congress deregulated the airline industry, the ab-
sence of economies of scale would increase the number of competitors. In reality
though, the existence of CRS reduced airline competition through marketing
and pricing structures. CRS owning airlines would bias their flights over other
airlines participating in the CRS. This would give the owner of the CRS a com-
petitive advantage in the airline market. In addition, CRS were a barrier to the
entry of new and smaller airlines. They could not afford to participate in a CRS,
a vital component in competition since most travel agents book through a CRS.
These factors, along with others, led to a supposed need for regulation. See Mad
J. Learning, Enlightened Regulation of Computerized Reservations Systems Requires a
Conscious Balance Between Consumer Protection and Profitable Airline Marketing, 21
TRANSP. L.J. 469, 476 (1993).
5 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. §§ 255.1-255.12
(1998).
6 The regulations will be discussed more fully in later sections, but include
display bias, discrimination among carriers, participation by owner airlines, term
of contracts, marketing, and booking information.
7 See generally, Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 536 (explaining that problems in-
clude biasing, small carrier biasing, and violations of antitrust statutes).
8 A secure connection is a connection via the Internet in which it would be
virtually impossible to "hack" into the system and steal the user's credit card num-
ber. In essence, it is a connection that allows safe passing of personal
information.
9 The DOT recognized the growing field of Internet CRS systems. They stated,
though, that there are currently "relatively few bookings through these services."
Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606, 47,607
(1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255). The DOT also recognized that in-
dustry experts believe that the Internet will eventually reduce the importance of
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current regulations have or will have on these sites. This com-
ment will examine whether or not the current regulations apply
to the Internet CRS or, if in the current business climate, the
regulations are still necessary. Because the DOT has called for
comments on revisions of the current regulations, this topic is
timely."' The revision is still not complete. In the interim, the
question remains, do the Internet CRS have to conform to the
DOT regulations?
This comment will examine the implications of continued
regulation of CRS. Part I looks at the development, participa-
tion in, and operation of CRS. Part II examines the concerns
surrounding CRS. Part III focuses on the legal developments
concerning CRS. Because most CRS are owned by airlines that
try to get an advantage, there have been many challenges to CRS
development and marketing. Part TV focuses on the current De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) promulgated regulations
and their continued necessity. Finally, Part V examines how the
DOT regulations will apply (or will not apply) to CRS use on the
Internet.
1. BACKGROUND
A. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS
1. Original Computer Reservations Systems
Before the development of CRS, airline carriers or travel
agents working with the carriers sold airline tickets. The travel
agent would question the traveler as to his travel needs. The
agent would then turn to the Official Airline Guide (OAG), a
book containing carrier schedules and fare information."' Us-
ing this information, the travel agent would determine the
flights and carriers that could best fit the customer's needs.' 2
The agent would next turn to the carrier tariffs, volumes con-
CRS. See id. at 47,608. An important note, though, is that Internet travel informa-
tion is facilitated through existing CRS.
", See generally Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg.
47,606 (1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255). The DOT keeps extending
the sunset date of the CRS regulations. Currently, the regulations remain in
force until March 31, 2001. See Third Extension of Computer Reservation Sys-
tems (CRS) Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,808, 16,809 (2000) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 255).
11 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,




taining the fare, rules, and restrictions for each flight.' The
agent would then call the air carrier to confirm the price and
availability and to make a reservation for the traveler.' 4 Finally,
the agent would write the airline ticket by hand to complete the
process. 15
In the 1960s, the first attempt at a CRS was under the name of
Automatic Travel Agency Reservations System (ATARS). ' This
was to be a joint venture among travel agents and twenty-one
different airlines.'7 This failed, in part, due to an early investiga-
tion by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)." s The CAB investi-
gated the proposal to examine the possible impact of an
industry-wide, single system on the air transportation industry."'
The CAB refused to grant antitrust immunity to the proposed
system .2 1 Accordingly, the project was abandoned.
Soon after, in 1976, both American Airlines and United Air-
lines announced that they would separately develop their own
CRS. 2' TWA soon followed in announcing that too would de-
velop its own system.22 The "traditional" process of finding and
reserving seats on airlines was cumbersome. 3 In response, air-
lines began developing their own in-house computer reservation
systems.24 It was only a matter of time before these in-house sys-
tems were expanded to be an industry-wide system.25
Airline deregulation also began to emphasize the necessity of
these systems.26 The systems became necessary after deregula-




See Learning, supra note 4, at 471.
17 See id. at 472.
18 See id. The CAB was the government agency charged with regulating the
airlines. See infra Part 111.B.1.
I9 See id.
20 See id.
21 See DonaldJ. Boudreaux & Jerome Ellig, Beneficent Bias: The Case Against Reg-
ulating Airline Computerized Reservation Systems, 57J. AIR L. & CoM. 567, 571 (1992).
22 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644
11,649 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
23 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "tradi-
tional" process.
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addition, fare and schedule changes became more frequent."8
Those in the industry needed a computer-based system able to
deal with vast amounts of information. New carriers also en-
tered the market after deregulation. 29 This too required a so-
phisticated system able to deal with the ever-increasing number
of flights.
Computer reservations systems and their development quickly
became an industry.") The CAB recognized in 1984, "that CRS's
[sic] have become the primary information and distribution re-
source for airlines and travel agents.""' CRS vendors have since
captured a niche in the travel industry. Most travel agencies use
CRS and most airline sales are through CRS. 12
There have been many different CRS in the past; most of
which have been owned by airline companies. For example, in
1983 there were six different CRS: Apollo, owned by United;
DATAS II, owned by Delta; MARS PLUS, developed by ITT in
conjunction with various airlines; PARS, operated by TWA; Sa-
bre, owned by American; and SODA, operated by Eastern:"
Due to consolidations and closures there are currently only
four domestic CRS. These include Sabre, Apollo, Worldspan,
and System One/Amadeus. 4 Sabre recently spun-off from
American Airlines,3 5 Apollo is operated by Galileo International
which is owned by United Airlines, Worldspan was formed
through a merger of Trans World Airline's and Delta's systems
and was joined by Northwest Airlines, and System One, was de-
veloped by Eastern Airlines and acquired by Continental Air-
lines."" Galileo (Apollo) has public shareholders, it is not wholly
28 See id. For example, airline carriers change about 133,000 fares and more
than 3,000 flight schedules in a typical day. See Learning, supra note 4, at 475.
29 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
'10 See Learning, supra note 4, at 472. ("When the major airline carriers devel-
oped their CRSs, a new industry emerged.")
3,1 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,648.
3'21 See Leaming, supra note 4, at 472. ("By 1987, 95 percent of all domestic
travel agencies used CRSs and travel agents booked 92 percent of the domestic
airline sales through them.")
'3 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,649.
'14 See Kevin j. Johnson, Computer Reservations System Participation: Is It Still Neces-
sary for Smaller Caniers?, 11 SPG AIR & SPACE LAw 1, 1 (1997).
3 See SABRE, AMR Completes Sabre Spin-Off News Release, Mar. 16, 2000 (vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://ir.stockmaster.com/wc/form/Pl?template=ir/TSG/
viewarticle2&Symbol=TSG&fi rst=&ArticlelD=SM-TSG-20000316a>.
36 See Robert F. Barron II, Code-Share Agreements: A Developing Trend in U.S. Bilat-
eral Aviation Negotiations, 72 IND. L.J. 529, 536 (1997); Fair Displays of Airline
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owned by the airline. 7 Sabre and Apollo are the two largest
systems. In 1999, the Sabre Group had revenues of $2.4 bil-
lion. 8 Galileo's (Apollo) revenue in the same year was $1.5
billion. 9
In conclusion, many factors led to the development of CRS.
Airline deregulation was probably the most important of these.
In addition, travel industry growth also propelled development.
Because of their ability to manage a vast amount of travel infor-
mation, the CRS have become more important and possibly in-
dispensable to the travel industry.
2. Internet Computer Reservations Systems
Many Internet sites allow users to access CRS. Sabre offers
www.travelocity.com; Galileo originally developed www.
travelpoint.com, which is no longer available, but they have now
acquired www.trip.com; Worldspan controls www.worldspan.
net 4°; and Amadeus offers www.amadeus.net. These are the
same systems offered to travel agents.
Internet CRS are relatively new. If rated by market share, Sa-
bre and Galileo are the two most popular CRS.41 Sabre
launched its Travelocity site in March of 1996.42 Galileo
launched its system through Travelpoint November 4, 1997.4-
Since then, the use of the Internet to book flights has greatly
increased. For example, Travelocity recently broke records with
its first million dollar day and six million dollar week.4 4
Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837, 63,839
(1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
'7 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. at 63,839.
38 See SABRE, Corporate Facts (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.sabre.com/
about/corp~jacts.html>.
39 See Galileo, 1999Financials (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.galileo.com/
investor/fin/invfin99.htm>.
40 Worldspan is provided through Tampa Travel Service, Inc. See Worldspan,
Dates & Destinations (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.worldspan.net>.
41 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,784,
59,785 (1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
42 See SABRE, Travelocity Breaks On-Line Sales Records with First $1 Million Day and
First $6 Million Week (last modified July 29, 1998) <http://www.sabre.com/news/
new98729a.htm>.
43 See Galileo, Galileo International Announces Global Launch of Travelpoint.com,
News Release, Nov. 4, 1997 (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.galileo.com/in-
vestor/finl>.
'14 See SABRE, Travelocity Breaks On-Line Sales Records with First $1 Million Day and
First $6 Million Week, (last modified July 29, 1998) <http://www.sabre.com/news/
new98729a.htm>.
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Travelocity provides reservation capabilities for more than "420
airlines, more than 40,000 hotels and more than 50 car rental
companies. 4
5
On the Amadeus web site, users must actually purchase the
ticket through a travel agent. The site states "[i]f you are new to
Amadeus, you will have to find a travel agent to handle your
bookings." ' Using this system, people may only check on flight
availability and price. Internet users on the Travelocity,
Trip.com, and Worldspan sites may actually book and purchase
tickets to be mailed or picked up at the airport. These systems
allow Internet users to bypass travel agents entirely.
In addition to allowing non-travel agents to use CRS on-line,
many companies have developed sites for use by travel agents.
For example, EasySABRE is used by travel agents on-line.47 In
addition, there are other various sites such as www.airtickets.
corn, which allow registered travel agents to use airfare con-
solidators through multiple CRS.48
B. PARTICIPATION IN COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS
"[V]irtually all U.S. airlines have found it essential to dis-
tribute their services through each of the four CRSs operating in
the United States due to two factors: the importance of travel
agencies in the distribution of airline services and each travel
agency's predominant use of a single system."4" These two fac-
tors are an important part of the decision of air carriers, espe-
cially smaller carriers, to participate in CRS.
In 1987, ninety-five percent of travel agents subscribed to a
CRS. ' In addition, ninety-two percent of ticket sales were
booked through a travel agency.5" Air carriers cannot ignore
these statistics. Most travel agencies subscribe to only one
, See id.
46 Amadeus, Amadeus.net (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.amadeus.net/
home/en/bookings/index_ta.htm>.
7 See <http://v.easysabre.com>.
48 Airfare consolidators are businesses, like the aforementioned site and Coun-
cil Travel, which buy large blocks of airline tickets at reduced prices. These re-
duceCd prices allow the businesses to sell airline tickets to customers at greatly
reduced fares.
' Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,197,
42,198 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
50 See Johnson, supra note 34, at *9.
51 See on 3
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CRS.5 2 Therefore, the airline companies, even smaller carriers,
usually must participate in all of the available CRS in order to
compete with other airlines. This reliance on CRS has allowed
the CRS industry to dictate its own terms for participation in the
system.5 ' This is a problem because the terms of the CRS owner
may not be favorable for competing airlines or for travel agents.
Because of the structure of the CRS industry, however, the com-
peting airlines and travel agencies really have no other choice
but to participate on the CRS vendors' terms if they plan to com-
pete in the travel industry. This has caused the anticompetitive
problems discussed in Part II.
C. OPERATION OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS
1. Travel Agent Operation
"A CRS consists of a periodically-updated central database
that contains information on airline services and other travel
services sold through the system. '5 4 The flow of information is
almost instantaneous. Airlines load their fares electronically
through the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO). 5
ATPCO is a distribution system owned by twenty-four different
international and domestic airlines.56 This company currently
collects information from over 550 airlines and distributes it to
CRS (e.g., Amadeus/System One, Galileo International, and Sa-
bre) .5 This database creates efficiencies in the process by per-
-52 See id. In addition, many CRS make it very difficult for travel agencies to
subscribe to more than one CRS. The CRS restrict travel agents by requiring that
a certain percentage of bookings must be by their system. This percentage is al-
ways greater than fifty percent. See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Sys-
tems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,651.
53 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at
59,784. (The terms for participation can include equipment clauses, participa-
tion levels for travel agents, and parity clauses for competing airlines.)
54 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,313,
59,314 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
5-, See Leaming, supra note 4, at 474.
56 These include: Air Canada, Air France, Alaska Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines,
Inc., American Airlines, Inc., British Airways, Canadian Airlines International,
Ltd., Chicago Helicopter Airways, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Delta Air Lines,
Inc., Federal Express Corporation, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Iberia Air Lines of
Spain, Japan Airlines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, LA Helicopter, Inc., LtIfthansa
German Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Inc., Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc., Scandi-
navian Airlines System, Swissair, Trans World Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines,
Inc., US Airways, Inc. See ATPCO, Our Owners (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.
atpco.net/setabout.html>.
57 See ATPCO, About ATPCO (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.atpco.net/
setabout.html>.
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mitting each airline to submit its information via ATPCO,
thereby giving each CRS the opportunity to access a single
source of fare-related data." The CRS and airlines subscribe to
the ATPCO. To the CRS, ATPCO offers automated data sub-
scriptions of passenger fares, rules, routings, cargo rates, and car
rental rates." The CRS then provides the ATPCO information
to their subscribers, the travel agents.
The CRS system itself is made up of computer terminals,
printers, and telecommunications links located in the travel
agent's office, usually leased from the CRS company."' This
computer is connected, via modem, to the CRS master com-
puter. It allows travel agents to determine "schedule, fare, and
seat availability information for every airline that subscribes to
the CRS.""' In addition, the travel agent can reserve a seat for
the customer and print out tickets. 6 2 The reservations are made
through the CRS by routing the information provided by the
travel agent to the central database of the CRS vendor, which
then relays the information to the air carrier.1
3
2. Internet Operation
Anyone (travel agents or not) may log on to a CRS on-line.
All four CRS have web sites."4 Most of the sites require that the
user have a user name and a password to enter." This is easily
obtained on first entry to the site. Users simply enter name, e-
mail, password choice, address, and travel preferences. The sys-
tem creates a user profile and then the user can automatically
access the site. After entering a name and password, the system
allows the user to chose from many options including airline,
hotel, and/or car reservations.
58 See id.
5) See id.
60 See Learning, supra note 4, at 474.
61 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir.
1991).
62 See United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th
Cir. 1985).
63 See Learning, supra note 4, at 475.
64 See supra notes 38-40, 46 and accompanying text for Internet addresses of
the CRS.
65 The passwords seem to be a marketing tool for the company providing the
site. For example, Travelocity states: "We ... use information you provide during
member registration or as part of the reservation process to customize the con-
tent of our site to meet your specific needs and to make product improvements




To obtain airline tickets, users enter the time, date, and cities
of both departure and return. They may also enter one or more
of several preferences: airline carrier, price, etc. After all the
required information has been entered, the system checks its
database and returns several different travel options.
II. CONCERNS REGARDING COMPUTER
RESERVATION SYSTEMS
A. BIASING
Biasing is a serious concern in the CRS industry, it is defined
as "displaying flight information in a way that favors their [CRS
owners] own flights."66 Biasing became a noticeable problem in
the early 1980s. The Department of Transportation found that
display bias was "rampant" before regulation began.67
Biasing is a problem of "deception."6 Many people did not
realize that when they talked to a travel agent and asked him to
book them on the most convenient flight the agent would be
using a "reservation system tilted in favor of the carrier that sold
him the system."69 In reality, however, CRS carriers biased the
displays in favor of their own services."' This inhibits a travel
agent's ability to provide objective advice.7"
The ability of the CRS to control biasing is created by the in-
dustry itself. Because airlines must participate in all systems due
to the role of travel agencies in airline distribution and the
agencies' reliance on CRS, each CRS is able to dictate its terms
for airline participation.7 2 The CRS control of the terms of par-
ticipation gives travel agents and airlines little leverage to ques-
tion bias.
There is great potential for airlines to bias their displays. Air-
lines would use their system to "prejudice airline competition
and give consumers misleading or incomplete information in
order to obtain more bookings."73 In addition, the Department
of Justice found that "airlines which own computerized reserva-
66 United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1107.
67 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 573.
68 See United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1113.
69 Id.
70 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,647 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
71 See id.
72 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at
59,784.
73 Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 47,607.
2000] 901
JOURNAL 01 AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion systems use them to weaken competition from other
airlines."74
CRS vendors were often biasing the algorithms75 used to de-
termine priority on the screen by weighting specific criteria de-
signed to produce the result that their flights were a "better
fit."'76 In this way, for example, CRS vendor X (airline owner X)
can instruct the computer CRS program to find X a better
choice for the customer (using price, route, or on-time vari-
ables). There are dangers in the process even if airline X's
flight is not the first displayed. For example,
A CRS can display a limited number of flights on its screen at a
time; if more flights are available in a market than can be dis-
played on a single screen, an agent using the CRS must ask to see
additional screens to see more flights. Travel agents often work
under significant time pressure, and as a result agents are more
likely to book a flight that shows up on the first screen than
flights appearing on later screens, even if the latter would better
meet a customer's needs. 77
Possibly because the agents believed that the systems were un-
biased, they were more likely to book a flight when it appeared
on the first screen of the display, and the flight most often
booked was the first flight shown on the first screen.7 1
Another type of biasing can occur if fare information is omit-
ted or delayed.79 Apparently, new schedules or fares were often
not included in CRS.a° In addition, some full flights would show
up as available and flights with unsold seats would show up as
full.y Misinformation such as this is just as harmful as the dis-
74 United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1110-11.
75 Algorithms are the formulas used by a CRS vendor to determine which
flights fit the customer's request best and ultimately determine the order of those
flights that will appear on the screen in response to a travel request.
76 See Leaming, supra note 4, at 485. (CRS vendors establish weights for certain
criteria such as departure and arrival times, plane types, city pairs, connecting
time, etc. By weighting one or more of these criteria, a CRS vendor can almost
ensure that their flights are first. The DOT found that United increased its reve-
nues by thirteen percent using this method.)
77 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 43,785-
86.
78 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRS), 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208 (1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
79 See Leaming, supra note 4, at 485.
81 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,662 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255) (sales and special fares may be




play biasing previously discussed. CRS owners' control of the
flow of information can also harm competition. Special deals
from smaller carriers may not timely appear on the CRS display,
causing that carrier to book fewer flights and hence, earn less
money.
The airlines could also bias using certain criteria to rank
flights. For example, they could "select a limited number of
connecting points for each city-pair market and construct con-
nections over those points and edit out certain connections,
based on various criteria. '8 2 This type of biasing, too, could
harm competition. The CRS vendor could designate the criteria
in a way to choose its own airline carrier on a consistent basis.
For example, CRS vendor X (airline owner X) is headquartered
in Dallas, Texas. The CRS vendor could construct a program
that no matter the customer's other preferences, if he were to
fly into Dallas, airline X would always be displayed first. Because
it could not be detected easily, the potential for abuse, and
therefore impact on competition, is great.83
Other types of display biasing include: omitting types of ser-
vices available from an airline at a given hub, limiting the
amount of information available on competing airlines, creating
an advantageous algorithm that consistently chooses the CRS
vendor airline over others, and providing inaccurate or skewed
information on connecting services.84
It seems that a slight bias in display would not make a differ-
ence. The Department of Transportation found that "it [the
problem of biasing] is big enough to generate millions of dol-
lars in extra passenger revenues for such airlines."8 The CAB
originally adopted CRS rules to prevent and correct the above-
mentioned forms of bias. 8"
B. COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES FOR TRAVEL AGENTS
Travel agencies must use CRS in order to provide services to
their customers. Agents usually subscribe to only one CRS. 7
There are agents, though, that subscribe to more than one CRS.
82 h. at 11,657.
83 See id.
84 See Learning, supra note 4, at 485-86.
85 United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir.
1985).
86 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg, at 63,839.
87 See Johnson, supra note 34, at *9.
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In order to increase bookings, CRS give incentives to travel
agents who use their system to book flights.
There are four types of incentives that CRS give to travel
agents.88
First, agents enjoy "override commissions" based on the vol-
ume of business booked with the airline offering the bonus.
Second, agents may be given membership in the airline's VIP
club, providing special waiting area and additional services for
members. Third, while flights may appear on the CRS screen as
completely booked, agents have overbooking privileges on the
carrier that owns the CRS that they are using. This privilege is
particularly useful to agents who must reserve last-minute
trips-generally for their business customers. Finally, airlines
provide free tickets through an award system similar to frequent
flyer plans for their passengers. Airlines will also offer sales in-
centives through free or reduced fare tickets to employees of
travel agents." '
In addition to these, travel agents may receive funding from
CRS vendors to advertiseY. These types of incentives not only
influence the system used by travel agents but also the level of
travel agent participation. These incentives also affect the
choices available to consumers. This potential limitation on
consumer choices is important for the same reason discussed in
the previous section: deception. Many people see travel agents
as their agents, not the agents of the CRS vendors. The influ-
ence of the CRS inhibits a travel agent's ability to provide objec-
tive advice.'
C. SMALL CARRIER BIASING
CRS are a great advantage to air carriers. They allow numer-
ous travel agents all over the world to access the carrier's sched-
ule and fares. Because travel agents are the primary distribution
mechanism and CRS are their main information source, smaller
carriers must participate in every CRS or they will be at a disad-
vantage in relation to their larger competitors.12 Smaller carri-
ers are almost required to participate in CRS in order to fill
flights."3 Small carriers may not have a large advertising budget








required to overcome the need to participate in a CRS. 4 In-
stead, small carriers must enter into co-host agreements with at
least one CRS.
The co-host agreement is disadvantageous to the smaller car-
rier. In order to participate in the CRS, they often have to par-
ticipate on terms that are not especially favorable for the airline.
As part of the co-host agreements, the small carrier must pay
booking fees to the CRS owner depending on the number of
flights booked.9 5 One of the problems created by these co-host
agreements is that the smaller less-favored carriers must pay
higher booking fees per ticket.96 This is even more true when
the carrier directly competes with the CRS owner.97 The higher
booking fees per ticket translate into higher fare prices for the
consumer. It has been estimated that CRS vendors make over
$300 million per year from smaller airlines. 8 This money is
generated through the booking fees, mentioned above, from
the smaller carriers. These fees far exceed the CRS actual trans-
action costs. 9  In fact, booking fees produce a 50 percent rate of
return of invested capital for Galileo and a 75 to 90 percent rate
of return for Sabre.' These co-host agreements, display bias,
and compensation and incentives for travel agents are all barri-
ers to a competitive market. They do not allow the travel agent
or the display on the CRS system to be unbiased. Each of these
problems influence the consumer's choice of travel provider by
directly biasing the travel agent's advice as to which carrier fits
the consumer's preferences or by indirectly biasing the prices.
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. ANTITRUST ACTIONS AGAINST AIRLINES
1. Legal Theories
When discussing antitrust actions, there are a few concepts
that must be understood. First, the Sherman Antitrust Act"'
regulates anticompetitive practices. In addition, there are two
94 See id. at 480.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 480-81.
98 See id.
9 See id.
100 See Hearing on the Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1992, (H.R. 5466, 138
CONG. REC. H. 8,093 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Rep. Oberstar).
101 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1998).
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distinct theories that are often discussed. These are the monop-
oly leveraging argument and the essential facilities doctrine.
The first two sections of the Sherman Act are the important
for this analysis.
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal.
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
1012felony....
Section 1 deals with concerted activity, activity between or
among more than one company. "" Section two deals with uni-
lateral activity, activity of a single entity." 4 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the Sherman Act "contains a 'basic distinc-
tion between concerted and independent action. ' ''11 5  The
Court also stated that concerted activity (§ 1 activity) is subject
to punishment if it restrains trade; unilateral activity (§ 2 activ-
ity), on the other hand, is subject to punishment if it threatens
actual monopolization. "
In the CRS context, Section 2 is the more important section.
In order for a plaintiff to recover under Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, he must show either actual monopolization or at-
tempted monopolization. Actual monopolization requires a
showing of two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or de-
velopment as a consequence of a superior product, business acu-
men, or historic accident." 107  A claim for attempted
102 1d.
Wi2 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir.
1991).
104 See id.
105 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)). In
Copperweld, the Supreme Court was examining whether or not a parent company
and its subsidiary could be in concert for the purposes of the Sherman Act. The
Court found that they cotild not.
I,(- See id. at 767-68.
17 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 541 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19, (1985) (quoting United States v. Grin-
nell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, (1966))).
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monopolization has two elements: "1) a specific intent to monopo-
lize a relevant market; 2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct;
and 3) a dangerous probability of success.'"" Attempted mo-
nopolization arises when "the danger of monopolization is clear
and present, but before a full-blown monopolization has neces-
sarily been accomplished."""1
a. Monopoly Leveraging
The Second Circuit examined the monopoly leveraging the-
ory in Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co.,' "' in 1979. It recognized
monopoly leveraging as a distinct cause' of action under Section
2 of the Sherman Act. The doctrine, as articulated by the Sec-
ond Circuit, states that "the use of monopoly power attained in
one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a viola-
tion of § 2, even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize
the second market."'11 Other circuits have followed the Second
Circuit and have used the monopoly leveraging theory as an in-
dependent theory of recovery. 1 2
There are two parts to the monopoly leveraging doctrine.
First, there must be a showing of an unwarranted advantage
gained from the use of the monopoly power." 3 Second, the
plaintiff must show that the two markets claimed to be leveraged
108 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 542; see also Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791
F.2d 1343, 1348 (9th Cir. 1986); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
703 F.2d 534, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
109 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 542.
"- 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). (Berkey was
one of the largest and most significant antitrust suits in history. The case was
unusual because Kodak was both Berkey's competitor and supplier in various
markets. The issue on appeal dealt with a new type of photo system, the 110.)
I I ld. at 276.
112 See, e.g., Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 61 F.3d 1 (4th
Cir. 1998); St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National Football League,
154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998); Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 145 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1998); Great W. Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.3d 1378 (5th Cir. 1995); Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Har-
court Brace jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540
(10th Cir. 1995); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1992).
113 See Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Cut Throat Competition in the Friendly Skies: Alaska
Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1603 (1992), 61 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 681, 690-91 (1992).
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are different and related."I4 Definition of the market however
has been difficult and many factors must be taken into account.
These factors include geography, product information, and us-
age demographics. 1 5 The plaintiff must show that there are two
distinct markets and that the markets are related because the
defendant used its monopoly power to gain an advantage in the
second market." 6
The monopoly leveraging concept can be applied to the area
of CRS. The CRS vendor can use the CRS system to secure a
monopoly over certain routes.'" The DOT even claims that
"the concept of monopoly leveraging is applicable to CRS's
[sic], since each vendor has the power and incentive to use its
control of a system to unfairly prejudice the competitive posi-
tion of its airline rivals.""' ' The monopoly leveraging concept,
however, ignores the fact that, as discussed in Part IV, display
bias can be controlled through market forces. "[T]he expected
monopoly profits may not exceed the value of revenues earned
by selling the premier listing to another airline."' '" This theory
also seems to ignore the fact that travel agents are more likely to
subscribe to the CRS that gives their customers the best deal.
While there are lengthy contracts, travel agents can change their
subscription. In addition, customers will search for the travel
agency that gives them the best deal. As these two elementary
examples show, the monopoly leveraging doctrine does not fit
well to the reality of CRS and airlines.
b. Essential Facilities
The essential facilities doctrine requires a business that con-
trols an essential facility fails to provide its competitors reasona-
ble access to that facility. 2 " "An essential facility is one which
cannot be reasonably duplicated and to which access is neces-
See Callow, supra note 113, at 691. (For example, the CRS industry and the
airline industry could be considered related. One makes reservations and tracks
information for the other.)
115 See id.
-; See id. at 692.
117 This can occur through display biasing, discussed in supra Part II.A.
11 Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,586,
12,602 (1991).
119 Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 581.
120 See In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F.




sary if one wishes to compete."'' This doctrine "imposes liabil-
ity when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a
second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the
second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first." '2
In order to recover under the doctrine of essential facilities, a
plaintiff must prove "that it is economically infeasible or impos-
sible to reproduce the facility, and that it imposes a severe hand-
icap on the market entrant if access is denied."1 23 The essential
facilities doctrine has not been accepted by all circuits and has
not been ruled on by the United States Supreme Court.124
The question that arises here is: Are CRS essential facilities?
There are differing answers to this question. The DOT stated in
1996 that it believes CRS are essential facilities. 25 Based on the
idea that CRS are essential facilities, the DOT required that
every system must offer all airlines access to its services on rea-
sonable terms. 126 The Ninth Circuit, in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc., however, found that CRS were not essential
facilities.1 27 This case occurred before the DOT mandate and
no cases have been brought since this declaration.
2. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit, in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Air-
lines, Inc., examined both the essential facilities doctrine and the
monopoly leveraging doctrine in relation to CRS.128 In Alaska
Airlines, airline competitors sued United and American based on
121 In reAir Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp.
at 1451. See also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986).
122 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir.
1991).
123 Callow, supra note 113, at 689.
124 See generally Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985). In deciding this case, the Supreme Court refused to address the question
of whether or not the essential facilities doctrine was a viable doctrine. "Given
our conclusion that the evidence amply supports the verdict under the instruc-
tions as given by the trial court, we find it unnecessary to consider the possible
relevance of the 'essential facilities' doctrine, or the somewhat hypothetical ques-
tion whether nonexclusionary conduct could ever constitute an abuse of monop-
oly power if motivated by an anticompetitive purpose. If, as we have assumed, no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing, that case is unlikely to
arise." Id. at 611 n.44.
125 "We concluded in our rulemaking that each of the systems is comparable to
an essential facility." Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 42,203.
126 See id.
127 See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549.
128 See id. at 54149 (discussing essential facilities and monopoly leveraging).
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allegations that their control over a CRS denied them access to
an essential facility, thus violating the Sherman Act. 129 The
plaintiffs were subscribers to Apollo and Sabre (the defendants'
CRS) and were concerned with the booking fees charged by
these particular CRS. 13 ° The plaintiffs claimed the defendants
had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by control-
ling an essential facility.' 3 ' The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, failing to recognize monopoly
leveraging or essential facilities doctrines. ' 2 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit claiming that the district court had
incorrectly applied the doctrines.' 3
a. Monopoly Leveraging
The plaintiffs claimed that the United and American Airlines
were using their power in the CRS market to gain a competitive
advantage over non-CRS-owner airlines. 14 The plaintiffs, how-
ever, admit that there is no claim under the theory of attempted
monopolization because there was no danger that either United
or American would monopolize the downstream market. 135 The
Ninth Circuit closely examined the Berkey monopoly leveraging
theory.'" It rejected the monopoly leveraging doctrine as an in-
dependent theory of liability. 3 v In fact, the Ninth Circuit went
further in stating that it "believe [s] that Berkey Photo misap-
plied the elements of Section 2 by concluding that a firm vio-
lates Section 2 merely by obtaining a competitive advantage in
the second market, even in the absence of an attempt to monop-
olize the leveraged market." 3 '
12 See id. at 536.
13o See id. Airlines joined as plaintiffs included: Alaska Airlines, Muse Air Cor-
poration, Midway Airlines, and Northwest Airlines.
131 ,See id.
132 See id. at 538.
133 See id.
I-" See id. at. 546.
13 , See id. at 545.
136 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); see alo supra notes 110-119 and accompanying
text.





Alaska Airlines claimed that United Airlines and American
Airlines had control"'" of an essential facility (the CRS) and thus
had violated antitrust laws. 4 " The plaintiffs requested that the
court take a very broad view of essential facilities doctrine, claim-
ing that the defendants had individually violated the Act even
though the defendants' control of the CRS did not give them
power to eliminate competition.'41 The Ninth Circuit reviewed
cases where courts found that the essential facilities applied and
analyzed each of cases in turn.
First, the Supreme Court has only dealt with one case involv-
ing a single firm's control of an essential facility. 4 2 In Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, the defendant (the power company)
refused to deal with its downstream competitors. The district
court found that Otter Tail had attempted to monopolize and
had actually monopolized distribution of electric power in its
area. "'43 When Otter Tail's retail franchises in small towns ex-
pired, it attempted to prevent the small towns from establishing
their own municipal electric systems, thereby limiting competi-
tion. '4 4 In refusing to allow competitors access, Otter Tail elimi-
nated any possibility of competition. The district court found
that Otter Tail had indeed illegally monopolized the electric
power industry in the area.' 45 The Supreme Court affirmed this
finding, concluding that Otter Tail, acting alone, had attempted
to monopolize and had in fact monopolized the market for elec-
trical services.' 46
The second case that the Ninth Circuit examined was MCI
Communications Co. v. AT&T. In MCI Communications Co., the
Seventh Circuit found that the essential facilities doctrine did
apply.'47 AT&T refused to allow MCI to use its network. MCI
sued AT&T for four separate causes of action: monopolization,
139 The control, as claimed by the plaintiffs, was individually, not jointly, exer-
cised. Because the plaintiffs did not claim any violation under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act (concerted activity, with a much lower legal standard required for
showing of violation) the Ninth Circuit did not examine any wrongdoing under
that statutory section. See id. at 542 n.8.
1,0 See id. at 536.
I'll See id. at 542,
1 12 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
1', See id. at 368.
141 See id.
45 See id. at 373.
146 See id. at 377-79.
",7 See MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
20001
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
attempted monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize-under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act-and conspiracy of restraint of
trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.48 Following a jury
verdict of $600 million, the trial court trebled the damages as
required by the Clayton Act, resulting in a judgment against
AT&T of $1.8 billion. 4" The Seventh Circuit found that AT&T
refused to grant access to a network that could not be dupli-
cated and that this refusal allowed AT&T to eliminate the com-
petition in a downstream market. 15
The final case examined by the Ninth Circuit is the Second
Circuit's decision in Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness.''
Twin Labs was a competitor of Weider, both were involved in
making and marketing nutritional supplements. 1 2 Twin Labs
often advertised in Weider publications. Weider later promul-
gated a rule that would not allow Twin Labs to advertise in its
publications.' 53 Twin Labs asserted three federal law claims:
monopolization, denial of essential facilities, and attempted mo-
nopolization. '5' The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. 155 On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant argued
only the essential facility and attempted monopolization
claims.' 5" The Second Circuit found that the denial of access to
advertising was not an essential facility stating that "[a]ntitrust
law, however, does not require one competitor to give another a
break just because failing to do so offends notions of fair
play." '5 7
After examining these cases, the Ninth Circuit found that in
order to have a facility considered "essential," the facility must
have "the power to eliminate competition in the downstream
market."'5'  The Ninth Circuit held that in Alaska Airlines, the
defendants' control did not give them the power to eliminate
competition since the plaintiffs were free to withdraw from Sa-
148 See id. at 1092.
1,i , See id. at 1093.
150 See id. at 1133.
151 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990).
152 See id. at 567.
153 See id.
15 See id. at 568.
1, See id. at 567.
156 See id. at 568.
157 i.
158 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 544.
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bre or Apollo. 5 ' Therefore, the CRS was not an essential
facility. 60
B. REGULATION OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS
1. Civil Aeronautics Board Authority
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) promulgated the original
CRS regulations in 1984.161 The CAB stated that in the Airline
Deregulation Act, Congress placed a high priority on
the prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive
practices in air transportation, including the avoidance of "excess
market domination and monopoly power" and other conditions
"that would tend to allow one or more air carriers unreasonably
to increase prices, reduce services, or exclude competition in air
transportation." 6 2
In fact, the CAB expressly stated that in light of the Airline
Deregulation Act, "we believe that we have not only the author-
ity but the responsibility under section 411 to take action to pre-
vent the use of market power in the CRS industry to lessen
competition in air transportation."' 6  The Seventh Circuit
agreed with the CAB. 16 4 The court stated that the provision in
the Federal Aviation Act that allows the CAB to make rules also
empowers it to "make only rules 'pursuant to and consistent
with the provisions of' the Act."'65 Section 411 authorizes the
Board to "investigate and determine whether any air carrier...
has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair
methods of competition."' 6" In addition, the Board may order
159 See id. at 545.
-, See id. at 549.
161 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644
(1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 11,656.
164 See United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir.
1985).
165 See id. at 1111. (Interpreting two sections of the CAB regulations: 14 C.F.R.
§§ 255, 256).
166 See id.; see also Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1985) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 41712). In fact, the Board has been issuing rules based on this section
since 1960; see, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 250 (dealing with overbooking); 14 C.F.R. pt.
254 (dealing with liability of airlines for lost luggage).
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the air carriers to stop such behavior." 7 This rule is still cur-
rently in place with only slightly modified language." '
Various agencies of the government were concerned about
anticompetitive practices. Complaints were filed about the op-
eration of the CRS systems."" - The CAB found that "[t] he com-
panion prohibition against 'unfair or deceptive practices' in
both section 411 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act was intended to protect consumers from trade practices
which, while not necessarily anticompetitive, were misleading,
contrary to recognized public policy or injurious to consum-
ers." 171 They felt that they could "forestall conduct where we
find that a potential for abuse exists."' 7 1 In 1984, the potential
was great enough that the CAB issued regulations regarding the
use and operation of CRS. 17 2
2. Development of CAB Regulations
The CAB found that "CRSs became essential for airline distri-
bution in the early 1980s'1 7 because of their "predominant role
in the marketing of airline services to customers."'' 74 The CAB
determined that the rules regulating the CRS were necessary be-
cause travel agencies and their customers could not prevent the
167 See id.; Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1985) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41712).
1- Unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition. On the initia-
tive of the Secretary of Transportation or the complaint of an air carrier, foreign
air carrier, or ticket agent, and if the Secretary considers it is in the public inter-
est, the Secretary may investigate and decide whether an air carrier, foreign air
carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in an tinfair or deceptive practice
or an unfair method of competition in air transportation or the sale of air trans-
portation. If the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, finds
that an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in an unfair or
deceptive practice or unfair method of competition, the Secretary shall order the
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to stop the practice or method. 49
U.S.C. § 41712 (1996).
11 9 Complaints were filed by many airlines. In addition, many airlines com-
mented that regulations were needed. See generally Carrier-Owned Computer Res-
ervation Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644 (1984) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 255).
170 i. at 11,653.
171 [i.
I% See. Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.1-
255.12 (1998). CAB regulations deal with most aspects of the CRS industry in-
cluding: display bias, enhancements, contracts with participating carriers, and
participation. See infra Part IV.
171 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606,
47,607 (1997).
174, Fail- Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs),
61 Fed. Reg. 42,197, 42,208 (1996).
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systems from offering biased displays and non-CRS-owning air-
lines did not have the power to keep the systems from biasing
their displays. 7 5 The CAB found the prejudice unacceptable.
"In 1982, the Board [CAB], along with the justice Department's
Antitrust Division, had, at the request of a Congress besieged
with complaints from travel agents and from airlines that do not
own computerized reservation systems, begun to investigate bias-
ing, price discrimination, and related practices." '76
In 1984, due in part to the CAB and Justice Department find-
ings from the investigation requested by Congress, the CAB
promulgated regulations for airline-owned and travel agent
used CRS. The CAB found "evidence that the owners of com-
puterized reservation systems had engaged in price discrimina-
tion and other practices symptomatic of monopoly or market
power." 177
The CAB was abolished in October of 1984.178 "Congress...
was very concerned to preserve (in the Department of Transpor-
tation) authority to enforce section 411.'' 7 Now, the authority
to enforce these regulations lies with the Department of
Transportation.
3. DOT Takeover of CAB Authority and New Regulations
After the DOT takeover, the CRS regulations stayed substan-
tially the same. In 1985, the Department of Justice found that
CRS owners still possessed substantial market power and that
the pricing practices continued to be discriminatory. 80 The
DOT announced that it would review the allegations of abuse.
In 1992, the DOT promulgated more stringent regulations.'8 '
Again in the late 1990s, the DOT began to get complaints from
smaller air carriers." 2 This has prompted a call for another revi-
175 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservation Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,547-
548 (1984).
176 United Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir.
1985).
177 Id. at 1117.
178 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. No. L. 98-443, §§ 3, 7, 98
Stat. 1703, 1706 (1984).
179 United Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1112.
180 See Learning, supra note 4, at 478.
181 See id. These are the regulations that are currently in force.
182 These carriers include: Alaska Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Midwest Express,
American West, and Delta. See generally Computer Reservations System (CRS)
Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,197 (1996); Fair Displays of Airline Services in Com-
puter Reservations Systems (CRSs), 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208 (1996); Computer Reser-
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sion of the rules. In fact, there is currently an open comment
period regarding yet another change in the regulations.'
IV. CURRENT REGULATIONS
A. COVERAGE OF THE RULES
The regulations governing activity by CRS are actually quite
broad, covering most all areas of CRS usage and marketing.
The rules prohibit the CRS owners from biasing their display
screens based on the identity of the carrier.'8 4 The CAB and
later the DOT mandated that each CRS charge the same book-
ing fee for each airline listed. 85 The regulations also cover con-
tracts between CRS vendors and participating airlines,'
participation levels by owners and subscribers,8 7 the use of
hardware and software, 8 and finally, marketing and booking
information. I "?
The stated purpose of the regulations is to "prevent unfair,
deceptive, predatory, and anticompetitive practices in air trans-
portation."''" The regulations also state that compliance does
not exempt persons from antitrust statutes, i.e. the Clayton
vations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,195 (1997); Fair Displays of
Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837
(1997); Complaint of Delta Airlines, Inc. against American Airlines, Inc. and SA-
BRE Associates, Inc., Order 96-10-48, 1996 WL 628193 (D.O.T.) (1996).
18" See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations (Part 255), 63 Fed.
Reg. 3491 (1998).
The Department regulates computer reservations systems owned by
airlines or airline affiliates that are used by travel agencies. The cur-
rent rules are designed to prevent the systems from unreasonably
prejudicing the competitive position of other airlines and to ensure
that travel agencies can provide accurate and unbiased information
to the public. The Department is reexamining its rules to see
whether they should be readopted and, if so, whether they should
be changed. As part of this action, a small entities review under 5
U.S.C. § 610 will be included.
Unified Agenda, 63 Fed. Reg. 22,304, 22,305-06 (1998).
184 Note, The Legal and legulatory Implications of Airline Computer Reservation Sys-
tems, 103 HARV. L. RFV. 1930, 1932 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
185 See id.





190 Id. § 255.1.
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Act.'91 Applicability of the regulations is also broad. This rule
applies to air carriers that "own, control, operate, or market
computerized reservations systems. ' 1 2 In addition, the regula-
tion states that the responsibility for compliance with these regu-
lations lies with the CRS owners.',"
In addition to applicability of the regulations to companies,
the regulations also explicitly state what types of systems are sub-
ject to the regulations. The DOT defines "system" as "computer-
ized reservations system offered by a carrier or its affiliate to
subscribers for use in the United States that contains informa-
tion about schedules, fares, rules or availability of other carriers
and provides subscribers with the ability to make reservations
and to issue tickets, if it charges any other carrier a fee for sys-
tem services.""'9 This definition has definite implications for the
applicability of the regulations to Internet usage.
As discussed earlier, participation in a CRS is vital for most
airlines. With a few exceptions, every major U.S. airline partici-
pates in a CRS system. The DOT requires that "[iln ordering
the information contained in an integrated display, systems shall
not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to carrier iden-
tity."'1 95 This is helpful for the smaller carriers. In addition, the
DOT states that "[s]ystems shall not use any factors directly or
indirectly relating to carrier identity in constructing the display
of connecting flights in an integrated display."' 96 As a check on
the systems, the regulations are written to allow anyone to re-
quest and receive information about the criteria and weights
used in ordering flights that are displayed. 197
Another problem identified by the CAB and the DOT is that
CRS vendors often delayed the posting of fare change, flight
availability, and other information. This can cause reduced
bookings on smaller air carriers who may otherwise attempt to
take advantage of "sales" and "special pricing." In order to deal
with this situation, the regulations require that "[e]ach system
shall apply the same standards of care and timeliness to loading
information concerning participating carriers as it applies to the
"9' See id. § 255.1(b). The Clayton Act is a statute that imposes liability on
those companies who attempt to monopolize.
1'12 See id. § 255.2.
193 See id. § 255.2.
19- Id. § 255.3.
195 Id. § 255.4(b).
196 Id. § 255.4(c).
197 See id § 255.4(b) (3).
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loading of its own information or the information of a system
owner." 198
The final problem identified in Part II was that of discrimina-
tory fees. These can be particularly disastrous for smaller carri-
ers. The regulations require that "[nlo system may discriminate
among participating carriers in the fees for participation in its
system, or for system-related services. Differing fees to partici-
pating carriers for the same or similar levels of service shall be
presumed to be discriminatory."'' In addition, participation
cannot be dependent on the purchase of any equipment, such
as terminal, computers, printers, etc.00 This is important be-
cause before the regulations use of a CRS required that the user
purchase hardware from the CRS vendor. This made it very dif-
ficult for travel agents to change CRS vendors because each
change meant more money invested in computer hardware.
As this brief description of the current rules shows, the
problems identified by both the CAB in the early 1980s and the
DOT in the late 1990s have been addressed through regulation.
Unfortunately, problems still exist as evidenced by complaints
and the continuation of the regulation.21' The DOT does not
actively enforce these regulations. The legal system is the main
venue for challenging CRS vendor's actions. There is a disa-
greement with courts (like the Ninth Circuit who found that
CRS are not essential facilities) and the DOT (who claims that
CRS are essential facilities). This conflict restricts potential
party access to the courts because they know that most courts
will not apply the essential facilities doctrine to CRS vendors and
no other legal doctrine seems to apply.
B. ARE THE REGULATIONS STILL NEEDED?
"The industry's dependence on SABRE and Apollo has re-
sulted in American's and United's domination of the air trans-
portation market. American and Untied control the agency
ticket distribution system and thus are able to manipulate the
economics of the current market while controlling the develop-
ment of new markets. '1 202
198 Id. § 255.4(d).
1.. Id. § 255.6.
200 See id. § 255.6.
201 See, e.g., Complaint of Delta Airlines, Inc. against American Airlines, Inc.
and SABRE Associates, 1996 Order 96-10-48, WL 628193 (D.O.T.) (1996).
202 Paul V. Mifsud, Computer Reservations Systehis and Automated Market Distribu-
lion in a Deregudated Aviation Industry, 1 J.L. & TECH. 143, 146 (1986).
918
COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS
In 1984, when considering the regulations, the CAB found
three distinct problem areas.2 °1 First, display bias seemed preva-
lent in the industry.2 4 Second, they felt that the charges for
smaller non-owning airlines for access to the CRS were discrimi-
natory.205 Finally, they found that the CRS gave owners a poten-
tial advantage over other competitors. 2 6 There have been, in
the very recent past, more complaints about the operation of
CRS. These complaints revolve around both the booking fees
and level of service offered. 2 7 However, the question remains,
are regulations from a branch of the federal government still
needed? The answer to this question deals with which better
serves the customer: regulation or free market competition.
The DOT believes that regulation is the path to a better-
served customer. It sees the problems with CRS as a market fail-
ure. 21 "8 The DOT believes that the market forces are insufficient
to promote consumer welfare. 2 '' Before regulation, the
problems were many; unfortunately, many of the same problems
still exist.
Display bias was prevalent before regulation (and some argue
continues today). This, in the eyes of many, is proof of the mar-
ket failure. The DOT found that "[b]ecause travel agents are
busy, they usually booked a flight from the first screen of the
display and often booked the first flight displayed . . . . As a
result, travel agents often booked consumers on less suitable
flights because the best flight was in a lower position on the first
screen or was on a later screen."' 2 ' Some observers question
whether this is true.2 1" ' It seems illogical that travel agents, in
trying to serve their customers, would not scroll to the next
screen to find the best deal, if indeed the CRS were biased. Cus-
tomers may "shop around" to other travel agents or to the In-
203 See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644,
11,645 (1984).
204 See id. at 11,645.
• 05 See id.
206 See id.
207 See generally Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulation, 62 Fed. Reg.
60,195 (1997); Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRS), 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208 (1996).
208 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,606,
47,607 (1997).
209 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 576.
210 Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,586,
12,608 (1991).
211 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 21, at 577.
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ternet to find the best price. The argument that a travel agent
would not be willing to look through several screens for the best
match for the customer does not carry much weight.
The second problem addressed is the idea that the market
cannot adequately regulate the CRS market. The main concern
is display bias. Again, this is when an owner CRS displays its
flights more prominently than the flights of the subscribers.
This problem, too, could be controlled through market forces.
Market forces would be more efficient than regulation. One
suggestion is that the CRS vendor could charge more for the
higher priority slots.2 12 It seems that many airlines would pay
high prices for their flights to appear in the highest slot.2 1 This
would allow the airlines that value the highest spot to purchase
it. The CRS vendor would simply "sell" it to the highest bidder,
even if the owner itself were the highest bidder. In this way, the
market would serve both competition and the consumer more
efficiently than regulation.
Another problem with regulation is that it interferes with in-
novation.2 14 Because of the concern surrounding algorithms
used and possible display bias, any CRS vendor that attempts to
vary its methods may be subject to DOT complaints and further
regulation.2 15 Choice of algorithms drives the bias; innovation in
this area could possibly solve many of the problems. Without
the freedom to experiment, the federal government may indeed
need to continue regulation.
The airlines have not fully considered a free speech argu-
ment. The Competitive Enterprise Institute attempted to inter-
vene in many of the initial suits but courts denied its motions. 211
The CRS regulations can be seen as speech of an electronic na-
ture, "where a party profiting from the customers attracted by
the information supplied the medium for communication. '' 217
This argument had been raised regarding the OAG in earlier
suits. There, the FTC argued that because the OAG was an es-
sential facility, restrictions on normal freedom of speech were
212 See id.
213 This rests on the assumption that the travel agent will not take the few extra
seconds necessary to find a flight that fits the customers exact preferences for
price, service, connections, etc.
21" This is true in many areas, not just in the Airline Computer Reservation
System arena.
215 See Note, supra note 185, at 1946.
216 See Fred L. Smith, The Case for Reforming the Antitrust Regulations (If Repeal is




justified.218 However, the DOT considers CRS essential facilities,
the single court to examine the issue found that CRS were not
essential facilities. 219 This argument may be viable in any chal-
lenge to the regulations.
Finally, competition in the CRS industry is currently not possi-
ble. An unbiased CRS may be more popular than the current
CRS on the market. Unfortunately, current regulation stifles de-
velopment. Travel agents may pay more in the beginning for a
CRS that claims to be unbiased and not affiliated with any air-
line. The market for an objective would be the best method for
regulation, not government imposed rules. 2 1
V. APPLICATION OF DOT REGULATIONS TO
INTERNET USE
Therefore, having discussed the development and operation
of CRS, the concerns regarding CRS, and current regulations,
the question now turns to the future. As in many areas of mod-
ern life, the Internet is the medium of the future. E-commerce
is a new and developing area of law. The current federal regula-
tions in many areas have not kept up with our emerging elec-
tronic reality. As discussed in Part I, CRS have entered the
Internet Age and are on-line.221 Users are able to purchase eve-
rything from audio equipment to clothing on-line; airline tickets
are no exception. By using CRS, home users may not only find
airline tickets and learn about their availability, they can actually
use their credit cards to purchase the tickets. This has potential
impacts for consumers. How would the current regulations ap-
ply to CRS usage on the Internet? Do they currently apply? Will
the DOT ever regulate Internet usage of CRS? These are impor-
tant questions to answer in the age of instant information.
A. APPLICATION OF CURRENT REGULATIONS To INTERNET CRS
There are many obstacles to overcome if the current regula-
tions are to apply to Internet usage of CRS.222 The purpose of
the regulations is to "set forth requirements for the operation
218 See id.
219 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir.
1991).
220 See Note, supra note 185, at 1946.
221 The CRS on-line are the same as those offered to travel agents (APOLLO,
SABRE, etc.)
222 Note: This is a very new area of the law. As a consequence, there are no
cases that deal with Internet CRS.
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by air carriers and their affiliates of computer reservations sys-
tems used by travel agents so as to prevent unfair, deceptive, pred-
atory, and anticompetitive practices in air transportation. '2 3
This section could be a serious impediment to regulation of In-
ternet use. Most people who will use the Internet systems to
find and book flights will not be travel agents. Therefore, the
Internet systems may not fall under the regulation because of
this fact.224 The DOT has explicitly stated that the regulations
will not apply to "systems used by persons other than travel agen-
cies. '12 5 The DOT also states that "we will not make our rules
applicable to systems available to home computer users. "226 It
reasons that there is no proof of prejudice to airline competi-
tion.27 The main question in these statements is whether the
DOT envisioned in 1992 that the Internet would become a daily
part of most American's lives. The DOT has begun to examine
the impact of the Internet on CRS regulations. It will be a sig-
nificant part of the study in determining whether to continue
and expand the regulations. 228
The regulations also only purport to regulate "air carriers and
foreign air carriers that themselves or through an affiliate own,
control, operate, or market computer reservations systems for
travel agents .... 22, Again, as in the previous discussion, the
regulation specifically states that the rules apply only to com-
puter reservation systems for travel agents. This section,
though, is seemingly less restrictive than the previous section.
Because of the limitation on owning, controlling, operating, or
marketing the systems this could apply to Internet systems. This
is especially true if the same company owns a travel agent CRS
223 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.1 (1998)
(emphasis added).
224 One clear exception to this will be Worldspan, who in its website makes it
clear that the reservations are made through Tampa Travel Service, Inc. See
Worldspan, Dales & Destinations (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http:///www.worldspan.
net>.
225 Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 42,794.
2" Id. at 42,794-95.
227 See id.
228 See Second Extension of Computer Reservations Systems Regulations, 64
Fed. Reg. 15,127, 15,128 (1999).
21, Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.2 (1998)
(emphasis added). It is important to note that Computer Reservation Systems
operated and owned independently of air carriers are also not regulated under
this section. This could possibly negate the argument in the previous section
about the development and marketing of an unbiased system that would be more
attractive to travel agents.
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and operates an Internet CRS. The difference here is the use of
the word "for" rather than the phrase "used by." In addition,
there is no addition of the word "exclusively." One could argue
that either of these regulations could apply to Internet CRS. Be-
cause of the specific requirement that the regulations cover only
CRS owned in part by an airline, Sabre, since its spin-off from
American Airlines, is no longer covered by these regulations.
The definition section of the regulation makes it fairly clear
that Internet CRS will not be regulated under the current rules.
First, the regulations refer to computer reservations systems as
"systems." System is defined as a "computerized reservations sys-
tem offered by a carrier or its affiliate to subscribers for use in
the United States that contains information about schedules,
fares, rules or availability of other carriers and provides subscrib-
ers with the ability to make reservations and to issue tickets, if it
charges any other carrier a fee for system services. '232 This sec-
tion nearly defines Internet CRS out of regulation. First, the
emphasis on not only making reservations but also on issuing
tickets. Currently, Internet users are not able to issue their own
tickets. Second, the definition discusses "subscribers." This sec-
tion defines this term as well. "Subscriber means a ticket agent,
as defined in 49 U.S.C. section 1301(40) that holds itself out as a
neutral source of information about, or tickets for, the air trans-
portation industry and that uses a system."'23' The definition
seems to preclude Internet users from being a "subscribers" and
the program used on the Internet as a "system." In addition, the
DOT states that "our proposed rule would not apply to in-
stances where CRS's [sic] are used by ticket agents who hold
themselves out as agents of selected carriers, nor does it apply to
CRS's [sic] used by persons other than ticket agents. 232
The rules themselves seem to regulate only CRS owned by air-
lines or affiliated with them and used by human travel agents.
Both of these terms restrict the regulations and do not allow the
rules to regulate systems used on-line. The DOT has also stated
that it is not attempting to regulate Internet systems.23 3 In
promulgating the original regulations the DOT explicitly stated
"[w]e propose to regulate only carrier-owned systems, and only
those used by travel agents as that term is commonly understood
23o Id. § 255.3.
231 h(.
232 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644, 11,668
(1984).
233 See id. at 11,658.
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today .... ,,2 This language seems to imply that any system or
user outside this mandate is not covered. Hence, the regula-
tions do not cover Internet use.
Air carriers have also voiced opinions on this topic. The Asso-
ciation of Asia Pacific Airlines has stated that "[tlo the extent
that certain parties may want to propose that airline reservation
systems offered through the Internet be subject to the CRS regu-
lations, we believe that airline reservation systems do not consti-
tute a 'system' as defined in the U.S. CRS rules, and, hence,
should not be covered by them. 2 5
B. WILL THE DOT REGULATE INTERNET CRS?
As seen from the previous section, the current regulations
probably do not apply to Internet usage of CRS. There have
been no cases or official rulings on this point. When Internet
users log on to the Internet CRS, they may not realize that the
system is closely affiliated with an airline. This is the problem of
deception recognized by the Ninth Circuit in the Alaska Airlines
case. " The CRS could feasibly bias the displays to enhance the
matches for their airline affiliate. -7
The question remains: Will the DOT regulate the Internet?
Moreover, if so, how will they accomplish the regulation? The
DOT recognizes the importance of the Internet but to date has
not specifically regulated Internet CRS usage. 38 In 1997, they
stated that "relatively few consumers currently book airline
travel through the Internet. '2 9 Many airlines have appealed to
the DOT to resolve the issue. Some have called for increased
regulation expanded to include Internet CRS. According to the
DOT: "The growth of Internet booking sites has led to requests
that we extend the coverage of at least some of our rules to such
booking sites. ' 4  The Association of Asia Pacific Airlines
234 (t.
3 Asia/Pacific Carriers Target Internet, Abusive CRS Bookings, AEROSPACE DAILY,
Dec. 10, 1997, at A25.
236 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1991).
237 Admittedly, this would be a difficult task. Any CRS with on-line connec-
tions, would have to produce two entirely different algorithms for use on its sys-
tem. This seems to be a costly venture only to obtain a few more seats.
238 See Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837, 63,842 (1997).
239 Id.




(AAPA) has called for the DOT to examine Internet booking.241
In addition, "Amadeus (supported by Continental) urges us
[DOT] to regulate the displays offered by on-line computer ser-
vices and Internet sites. 2 42
The DOT does seem willing to consider regulating Internet
usage. The idea has come up in many of its recent publications
regarding the CRS rules.24 The Department has issued a call
for public comment on the topic. They also note that "[t]he
impact of the Internet, however, is an issue that we intend to
consider in detail in our upcoming examination of the CRS
rules. 244
If the DOT does decide to regulate Internet usage of CRS,
how may they go about it? There have been many suggestions
on how this could occur. US Airways suggests that "companies
providing Internet booking ability be given the option of com-
plying with anti-bias rules or notifying consumers that they do
not."245 This would be an information requirement. A regula-
tion dealing with this may mandate that companies at least tell
users which company owns and controls the CRS. A second pos-
sibility would be for the DOT to require that all CRS use the
same algorithm. This would be an extreme solution because it
would force all CRS into a single mold, possibly stifling
innovation.
One problem is encountered with the above mentioned solu-
tions. The goal of the current regulations is to enhance compe-
tition and allow the consumer to have an unbiased answer to his
travel questions. When a person calls a travel agent, he assumes
that the travel agent is working for him, finding him the best
flight to meet his needs. With an Internet CRS, the same may or
may not be true. Without the human contact, the expectation
may be lower. There may or may not be the expectation that
the system is working for the individual and is unbiased.
241 See Asia/Pacific Carriers Target Internet, Abusive CRS Bookings, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Dec. 10, 1997, at A25.
242 Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs),
62 Fed. Reg. at 63,846.
243 See generally Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Sys-
tems (CRS), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837 (1997); Computer Reservations System (CRS)
Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,313 (1997); Fair Displays of Airline Services in Com-
puter Reservations Systems (CRSs), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837 (1997).
244 Fair Displays of Airline Services in Computer Reservations Systems (CRSs),
62 Fed. Reg. at 63,842-43.
245 US Airways Warns of Continued Upward Spiral in CRS Fees, AVIATION DAILY, Jan.
12, 1998, at 48.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Coming to a conclusion in situations such as this is often diffi-
cult. As a society, we are coming into a new age of human exis-
tence. The Internet has become and will continue to be the
medium of the future. The federal and state governments will
soon have to address concerns regarding the Internet. For ex-
ample, Who owns the Internet? Can it be taxed? How do the
Internet and the First Amendment intertwine? The Department
of Transportation, too, is currently examining questions about
CRS and the Internet.
Society was changing rapidly in the mid-1970s. After deregu-
lation many more airlines formed to serve passengers. Sched-
ules became more intricate to deal with the ever-increasing
number of airline passengers. CRS were developed to adapt to
this changing society. Information about airline reservations
was too volumous to be adequately controlled by manual opera-
tion. It only took a decade before these new systems designed to
deal with complicated information developed into an industry
itself.
CRS quickly became indispensable in controlling airline infor-
mation. Because of this importance and dependence on CRS,
problems began to arise. Biasing, limiting available informa-
tion, and providing incentives for travel agents soon began to
interfere in fair competition.
Society has now entered yet another era. The 1960s and
1970s saw the beginning of the computer era. The 1990s have
become the Internet era. There are many questions about who
will "control" or regulate the Internet. This is a special concern
for CRS. As it stands now, the DOT regulations do not seem to
apply to Internet use by non-travel agent individuals. The defi-
nitions in the regulations seem to preclude application to In-
ternet use. There have been many antitrust situations involving
CRS in the past. This will probably continue into the future un-
less the DOT addresses the problem quickly. In the realm of the
CRS industry, there is great potential for abuse. Either the gov-
ernment or private party actions will soon determine how much
abuse the market can withstand. The DOT, however, will proba-
bly be better equipped to deal with the situation found in the
travel industry.
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